THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
 
OLIGARCHICAL COLLECTIVISM 
 
by 
 
Emmanuel Goldstein 
 
 
 
 
 Winston began reading:
 
Chapter          I 
 
 
 
Ignorance is Strength 
 
 
Throughout recorded time, and probably
         since the end of the  Neolithic Age, there have 
been
         three kinds of people in the world, the  High, the Middle,          and the Low.
         They have
 been subdivided          in many ways,  they
         have borne countless different names, and their 
relative
         numbers,  as well as their attitude towards one another, have varied from age
 to  age: but the essential structure of society has never altered. Even  after enormous 
upheavals and seemingly irrevocable changes, the same  pattern has always reasserted
         
itself, just as a gyroscope will always  return to equilibrium,
         however far it is pushed one
 way or the other. 
 
 
The aims of these groups are entirely irreconcilable... 
 
 
 
Winston stopped
         reading, chiefly in order to appreciate the fact  that he was reading, in 
comfort and safety. He was alone: no telescreen,  no ear at the keyhole, no nervous 
impulse to glance over his shoulder  or cover the page with his hand. The sweet summer
 air played against his  cheek. From somewhere far away there floated the faint
         shouts
 of  children: in the room itself there was no
         sound except the insect voice  of the clock.
 He settled
         deeper into the arm-chair and put his feet up  on the fender. It was bliss, it was 
eternity. Suddenly, as one sometimes  does with a book of which one knows that one 
will ultimately read and  re-read every word, he opened it at a different place
         and found
 himself  at Chapter III. He went on reading:
         
 
 
 
Chapter III 
 
 
 
War is Peace 
 
 
 
The splitting up of the world
         into three great super-states was an  event which could be and
 indeed was foreseen before the middle of the  twentieth century. With the absorption of
 Europe by Russia and of the  British Empire by the United States, two of the
         three existing
 powers,  Eurasia and Oceania, were already
         effectively in being. The third,  Eastasia, 
only emerged
         as a distinct unit after another decade of  confused fighting. The frontiers
 between the three super-states are in  some places arbitrary, and in others they fluctuate
 according to the  fortunes of war, but in general they follow geographical lines.
         Eurasia
  comprises the whole of the northern part of
         the European and Asiatic  land-mass, from
 Portugal to
         the Bering Strait. Oceania comprises the  Americas, the Atlantic islands including
 the British Isles, Australasia,  and the southern portion of Africa. Eastasia, smaller than 
the others  and with a less definite western frontier, comprises China and the
         countries 
to the south of it, the Japanese islands and
         a large but  fluctuating portion of Manchuria,
 Mongolia,
         and Tibet. 
 
In one combination or another, these three super-states are  permanently at war, and 
have been so for the past twenty-five years.  War, however, is no longer the desperate,
 annihilating struggle that it  was in the early decades of the twentieth century.
         It is a warfare
 of  limited aims between combatants
         who are unable to destroy one another,  have no 
material
         cause for fighting and are not divided by any genuine  ideological difference. 
 
 
This is not to say that either the conduct of
         war, or the prevailing attitude towards it, has
 become
         less bloodthirsty  or more chivalrous. On the contrary, war hysteria is continuous
 and  universal in all countries, and such acts as raping, looting, the  slaughter of children, 
the reduction of whole populations to slavery,  and reprisals against prisoners
         which 
extend even to boiling and burying  alive, are
         looked upon as normal, and, when they are 
committed
         by one's  own side and not by the enemy, meritorious. But in a physical sense 
war  involves very small numbers of people, mostly highly-trained  specialists, and causes 
comparatively few casualties. The fighting, when  there is any, takes place on
         the vague
 frontiers whose whereabouts the  average man
         can only guess at, or round the Floating 
Fortresses
         which  guard strategic spots on the sea lanes. In the centres of civilization  war
 means no more than a continuous shortage of consumption goods, and  the occasional 
crash of a rocket bomb which may cause a few scores of  deaths. War has in fact
         changed
 its character. More exactly, the reasons  for
         which war is waged have changed in their 
order of importance.
         Motives which were already present to some small extent in the great
  wars of the early twentieth century have now become dominant and are  consciously 
recognized and acted upon. 
         
To understand the nature of the present war -- for in spite of the  regrouping
         which occurs
 every few years, it is always the same
         war --  one must realize in the first place that it 
is
         impossible for it to be  decisive. None of the three super-states could be definitively 
conquered  even by the other two in combination. They are too evenly matched, and 
 their natural defences are too formidable. Eurasia is protected by its  vast
         land spaces. 
 Oceania by the width of the Atlantic
         and the Pacific,  Eastasia by the fecundity and 
industriousness
         of its inhabitants.  Secondly, there is no longer, in a material sense,
 anything to fight about. 
 
 
With the establishment of self-contained economies, in which  production and
         consumption
 are geared to one another, the scramble
         for  markets which was a main cause of previous 
wars
         has come to an end,  while the competition for raw materials is no longer a matter 
of life  and death. In any case each of the three super-states is so vast that it  can obtain 
almost all the materials that it needs within its own  boundaries. In so far
         as the war has a
 direct economic purpose, it is a  war
         for labour power. Between the frontiers of the 
super-states,
         and not  permanently in the possession of any of them, there lies a rough  
quadrilateral with its corners at Tangier, Brazzaville, Darwin, and Hong  Kong, containing
 within it about a fifth of the population of the  earth. It is for the possession
         of these 
thickly-populated regions, and  of the northern
         ice-cap, that the three powers are 
constantly  struggling.
         In practice no one power ever controls the whole of the  disputed
area. Portions of it are constantly changing hands, and it is  the chance of seizing this
 or that fragment by a sudden stroke of  treachery that dictates the endless
         changes
 of alignment. 
 
All of the disputed territories contain
         valuable minerals, and some  of them yield important 
vegetable
         products such as rubber which in  colder climates it is necessary to synthesize by
 comparatively expensive  methods. But above all they contain a bottomless reserve of
 cheap  labour. Whichever power controls equatorial Africa,
         or the countries of  the Middle 
East, or Southern India,
         or the Indonesian Archipelago,  disposes also of the bodies of scores 
or hundreds of millions of  ill-paid and hard-working coolies. The inhabitants of these areas,  
reduced more or less openly to the status of slaves, pass continually  from conqueror
 to conqueror, and are expended like so much coal or oil  in the race to turn
         out more
 armaments, to capture more territory, to  control
         more labour power, to turn out more 
armaments, to capture
         more  territory, and so on indefinitely. It should be noted that the
 fighting  never really moves beyond the edges of the disputed areas. The frontiers  of Eurasia
 flow back and forth between the basin of the Congo and the  northern shore of
         the Mediterranean;
 the islands of the Indian Ocean and
         the Pacific are constantly being captured and 
recaptured
         by Oceania or  by Eastasia; in Mongolia the dividing line between Eurasia and
 Eastasia  is never stable; round the Pole all three powers lay claim to enormous  territories
 which in fact are largely unihabited and unexplored: but the  balance of power
         always remains
 roughly even, and the territory which
         forms the heartland of each super-state always
 remains
         inviolate.  Moreover, the labour of the exploited peoples round the Equator is not 
 really necessary to the world's economy. They add nothing to the wealth  of the world, 
since whatever they produce is used for purposes of war,  and the object of waging
         a war
 is always to be in a better position in  which
         to wage another war. By their labour the slave
 populations
         allow  the tempo of continuous warfare to be speeded up. But if they did not  
exist, the structure of world society, and the process by which it  maintains itself, would
 not be essentially different. 
 
The primary aim of modern warfare (in accordance
         with the principles  of doublethink, this
 aim is simultaneously
         recognized and not  recognized by the directing brains of the Inner
 Party) is to use up the  products of the machine without raising the general standard of 
living.  Ever since the end of the nineteenth century, the problem of what to
         do  with the 
surplus of consumption goods has been latent
         in industrial  society. At present, when few 
human beings
         even have enough to eat, this  problem is obviously not urgent, and it might
 not have become so, even  if no artificial processes of destruction had been at work. The 
world of  today is a bare, hungry, dilapidated place compared with the world
         that  existed 
before 1914, and still more so if compared
         with the imaginary  future to which the people
 of that
         period looked forward. In the early  twentieth century, the vision of a future society 
unbelievably rich,  leisured, orderly, and efficient -- a glittering antiseptic world of  glass and
 steel and snow-white concrete -- was part of the consciousness  of nearly every
         literate 
person. Science and technology were developing
         at a prodigious speed, and it seemed natural 
to assume
         that they would  go on developing. This failed to happen, partly because of 
the  impoverishment caused by a long series of wars and revolutions, partly  because scientific
 and technical progress depended on the empirical  habit of thought, which could
         not survive 
in a strictly regimented  society. As a
         whole the world is more primitive today than it was fifty 
         years ago. Certain backward areas have advanced, and various devices,  always in some way
 connected with warfare and police espionage, have  been developed, but experiment and 
invention have largely stopped, and  the ravages of the atomic war of the nineteen-fifties
         have
 never been  fully repaired. 
 
 
Nevertheless
         the dangers inherent in the machine are  still there. From the moment when
 the machine first made its appearance  it was clear to all thinking people that the need for
 human drudgery,  and therefore to a great extent for human inequality, had disappeared.
  If the machine were used deliberately for that end, hunger, overwork,  dirt,
         illiteracy, and 
disease could be eliminated within a
         few  generations. And in fact, without being used for 
any
         such purpose, but  by a sort of automatic process -- by producing wealth which it was
  sometimes impossible not to distribute -- the machine did raise the  living standards of
 the average human being very greatly over a period  of about fifty years at
         the end of the
 nineteenth and the beginning of  the
         twentieth centuries. 
 
But it was also clear that an all-round increase in wealth  threatened the destruction -- 
indeed, in some sense was the destruction  -- of a hierarchical society. In a
         world in which 
everyone worked short  hours, had enough
         to eat, lived in a house with a bathroom and
 a  refrigerator,
         and possessed a motor-car or even an aeroplane, the most  obvious and
 perhaps the most important form of inequality would already  have disappeared. If it once 
became general, wealth would confer no  distinction. It was possible, no doubt,
         to imagine 
a society in which  wealth, in the sense
         of personal possessions and luxuries, should be  
evenly
         distributed, while power remained in the hands of a small  privileged caste. 
 
But in practice such a society could not long remain  stable. For if leisure
         and security
 were enjoyed by all alike, the great  mass
         of human beings who are normally stupefied
 by poverty
         would become  literate and would learn to think for themselves; and when 
once they  had done this, they would sooner or later realize that the privileged  minority
 had no function, and they would sweep it away. In the long run,  a hierarchical
         society 
was only possible on a basis of poverty and
         ignorance. To return to the agricultural past,
 as some
         thinkers about  the beginning of the twentieth century dreamed of doing, was 
not a  practicable solution. It conflicted with the tendency towards  mechanization which
 had become quasi-instinctive throughout almost the  whole world, and moreover,
         any 
country which remained industrially  backward was
         helpless in a military sense 
and was bound to be dominated,
         directly or indirectly, by its more advanced rivals. 
         
Nor was it a satisfactory solution to keep the masses in poverty by  restricting
         the output
 of goods. This happened to a great extent
         during  the final phase of capitalism, roughly
 between
         1920 and 1940. The  economy of many countries was allowed to stagnate, land
 went out of  cultivation, capital equipment was not added to, great blocks of the  population
 were prevented from working and kept half alive by State  charity. But this,
         too, entailed 
military weakness, and since the  privations
         it inflicted were obviously unnecessary, it
 made opposition
         inevitable. The problem was how to keep the wheels of industry turning  
without increasing the real wealth of the world. Goods must be produced,  but they must
 not be distributed. And in practice the only way of  achieving this was by continuous warfare. 
 
The essential act of
         war is destruction, not necessarily of human  lives, but of the products
 of human labour. War is a way of shattering  to pieces, or pouring into the stratosphere, 
or sinking in the depths of  the sea, materials which might otherwise
         be used to make the 
masses too  comfortable,
         and hence, in the long run, too intelligent. Even when  weapons 
of war are not actually destroyed, their manufacture is still a  convenient way of expending
 labour power without producing anything that  can be consumed. A Floating Fortress,
         
for example, has locked up in it  the labour that would
         build several hundred cargo-ships.
 
 
 Ultimately it  is scrapped as obsolete, never having brought any material benefit
         to  
anybody, and with further enormous labours another
         Floating Fortress is  built. In 
principle the war effort
         is always so planned as to eat up any  surplus that might exist
 after meeting the bare needs of the  population. In practice the needs of the population
 are always  underestimated, with the result that there is a chronic shortage
         of half  the
 necessities of life; but this is looked
         on as an advantage. It is  deliberate policy to keep
         even the favoured groups somewhere near the  brink of hardship, because a general
 state of scarcity increases the  importance of small privileges and thus magnifies the
 distinction  between one group and another. By the standards of the early twentieth
         century, 
even a member of the Inner Party lives an austere,
         laborious  kind of life. Nevertheless, 
the few luxuries
         that he does enjoy his  large, well-appointed flat, the better texture of his 
clothes, the  better quality of his food and drink and tobacco, his two or three  servants, 
his private motor-car or helicopter -- set him in a different  world from a member
         of the
 Outer Party, and the members of the Outer  Party
         have a similar advantage in comparison
 with the submerged
         masses  whom we call 'the proles'. The social atmosphere is that 
of a besieged  city, where the possession of a lump of horseflesh makes the difference  
between wealth and poverty. And at the same time the consciousness of  being
         at war, 
and therefore in danger, makes the handing-over
         of all  power to a small caste seem 
the natural, unavoidable
         condition of  survival. 
 
War, it will be seen, accomplishes the necessary destruction, but  accomplishes it in a 
psychologically acceptable way. In principle it  would be quite simple to waste
         the surplus
 labour of the world by  building temples
         and pyramids, by digging holes and filling them up
 
         again, or even by producing vast quantities of goods and then setting  fire to them. But
 this would provide only the economic and not the  emotional basis for a hierarchical society.
 
 
 What is concerned
         here is  not the morale of masses, whose attitude is unimportant so long 
as they  are kept steadily at work, but the morale of the Party itself. Even the  humblest Party
 member is expected to be competent, industrious, and even  intelligent within
         narrow limits, 
but it is also necessary that he  should
         be a credulous and ignorant fanatic whose prevailing 
moods
         are  fear, hatred, adulation, and orgiastic triumph. In other words it is  necessary that 
he should have the mentality appropriate to a state of  war. It does not matter whether the 
war is actually happening, and,  since no decisive victory is possible, it does
         not matter 
whether the  war is going well or badly.
         All that is needed is that a state of war  should exist.
 
 
 The splitting of the intelligence which the Party requires  of its members,
         and which is more
 easily achieved in an atmosphere of
         war, is now almost universal, but the higher up the 
ranks
         one goes, the  more marked it becomes. It is precisely in the Inner Party that war  
hysteria and hatred of the enemy are strongest. In his capacity as an  administrator, it is 
often necessary for a member of the Inner Party to  know that this or that item
         of war news
 is untruthful, and he may often  be aware
         that the entire war is spurious and is either not 
happening
         or  is being waged for purposes quite other than the declared ones: but such
  knowledge is easily neutralized by the technique of doublethink.  Meanwhile no Inner Party
 member wavers for an instant in his mystical  belief that the war is real, and
         that it is
 bound to end victoriously,  with Oceania
         the undisputed master of the entire world. 
 
All members of the Inner Party believe in this coming conquest as an  article of faith. 
It is to be achieved either by gradually acquiring  more and more territory and
         so building
 up an overwhelming preponderance  of power,
         or by the discovery of some new and 
unanswerable weapon.
         The  search for new weapons continues unceasingly, and is one
 of the very few  remaining activities in which the inventive or speculative type of mind
  can find any outlet. In Oceania at the present day, Science, in the old  sense,
         has almost
 ceased to exist. In Newspeak there is no
         word for  'Science'. The empirical method of 
thought,
         on which all the scientific  achievements of the past were founded, is opposed
 to the most  fundamental principles of Ingsoc. And even technological progress only
  happens when its products can in some way be used for the diminution of  human
         liberty.
 
 
 In all the useful arts the world is either standing still  or going backwards. The fields are 
cultivated with horse-ploughs while  books are written by machinery. But in matters
         of vital
 importance --  meaning, in effect, war and
         police espionage -- the empirical approach  is
 still
         encouraged, or at least tolerated. The two aims of the Party  are to conquer the whole
 surface of the earth and to extinguish once and  for all the possibility of independent thought.
 
 
 There are therefore
         two  great problems which the Party is concerned to solve. One is how 
to  discover, against his will, what another human being is thinking, and  the other is how
         to
 kill several hundred million people
         in a few seconds  without giving warning beforehand.
 
 
 In so far as scientific research  still continues, this is its subject matter.
         The scientist 
of today is  either a mixture of psychologist
         and inquisitor, studying with real  ordinary 
minuteness
         the meaning of facial expressions, gestures, and  tones of voice, and testing 
the truth-producing effects of drugs, shock  therapy, hypnosis, and physical torture; or he
 is chemist, physicist, or  biologist concerned only with such branches of his
         special subject
 as  are relevant to the taking of life.
         In the vast laboratories of the  Ministry of Peace, and
         in the experimental stations hidden in the  Brazilian forests, or in the Australian desert, or 
on lost islands of  the Antarctic, the teams of experts are indefatigably at work. 
 
 
 Some are  concerned
         simply with planning the logistics of future wars; others  devise larger
 and larger rocket bombs, more and more powerful  explosives, and more and more impenetrable 
armour-plating; others search  for new and deadlier gases, or
         for soluble poisons capable 
of being  produced in such
         quantities as to destroy the vegetation of whole  continents, 
or for breeds of disease germs immunized against all  possible antibodies; others
         strive to
 produce a vehicle that shall bore  its way
         under the soil like a submarine under the water, 
or
         an aeroplane  as independent of its base as a sailing-ship; others explore even  remoter
 possibilities such as focusing the sun's rays through lenses  suspended thousands of 
kilometres away in space, or producing artificial  earthquakes
         and tidal waves by tapping 
the heat at the
         earth's centre. 
 
But none of these projects ever comes anywhere near realization, and  none of the three 
super-states ever gains a significant lead on the  others. What is more remarkable
         is that 
all three powers already  possess, in the atomic
         bomb, a weapon far more powerful than 
any that  their
         present researches are likely to discover. Although the Party,  according 
to its habit, claims the invention for itself, atomic bombs  first appeared as early as the
 nineteen-forties, and were first used on a  large scale about ten years later.
         At that time 
some hundreds of bombs  were dropped on
         industrial centres, chiefly in European Russia,
 Western
         Europe, and North America. The effect was to convince the ruling groups  of 
all countries that a few more atomic bombs would mean the end of  organized society, 
and hence of their own power. Thereafter, although no  formal agreement was ever
         made
 or hinted at, no more bombs were  dropped. All
         three powers merely continue to produce
 atomic bombs
         and  store them up against the decisive opportunity which they all believe
  will come sooner or later. And meanwhile the art of war has remained  almost stationary
 for thirty or forty years. Helicopters are more used  than they were
         formerly, bombing
 planes have been
         largely superseded by  self-propelled projectiles, and the fragile movable
 battleship has given  way to the almost unsinkable Floating Fortress; but otherwise
 there has  been little development. The tank, the submarine, the torpedo, the
         machine 
gun, even the rifle and the hand grenade are
         still in use. And  in spite of the endless
 slaughters
         reported in the Press and on the  telescreens, the desperate battles of earlier
 wars, in which hundreds of  thousands or even millions of men were often killed in a 
few weeks,  have never been repeated. 
 
None of the three super-states ever attempts
         any manoeuvre which  involves the risk of 
serious defeat.
         When any large operation is  undertaken, it is usually a surprise attack 
against an ally. The  strategy that all three powers are following, or pretend to themselves  
that they are following, is the same. The plan is, by a combination of  fighting,
         bargaining, 
and well-timed strokes of treachery, to
         acquire a  ring of bases completely encircling one 
or
         other of the rival states,  and then to sign a pact of friendship with that rival and remain
 on  peaceful terms for so many years as to lull suspicion to sleep. During  this time rockets 
loaded with atomic bombs can be assembled at all the  strategic spots; finally
         they will all
 be fired simultaneously, with  effects
         so devastating as to make retaliation impossible. 
 
 
It will then  be time to sign a pact of friendship with the remaining world-power,
         in  preparation
 for another attack. This scheme, it
         is hardly necessary to  say, is a mere daydream, impossible
         of realization. Moreover, no  fighting ever occurs except in the disputed areas round the 
Equator and  the Pole: no invasion of enemy territory is ever undertaken. This  explains the
 fact that in some places the frontiers between the  superstates are arbitrary.
         Eurasia, for
 example, could easily conquer  the British
         Isles, which are geographically part of Europe,
 or on
         the  other hand it would be possible for Oceania to push its frontiers to the  Rhine or 
even to the Vistula. But this would violate the principle,  followed on all sides though never
 formulated, of cultural integrity. If  Oceania were to conquer the areas
         that used once
 to be known as France
         and Germany, it would be necessary either to exterminate the 
 inhabitants, a task of great physical difficulty, or to assimilate a  population of about a
 hundred million people, who, so far as technical  development
         goes, are roughly on the 
Oceanic level. The problem
         is the  same for all three super-states. It is absolutely necessary
 to their  structure that there should be no contact with foreigners, except, to a  limited extent, 
with war prisoners and coloured slaves. Even the  official ally of the moment
         is always
 regarded with the darkest  suspicion. War
         prisoners apart, the average citizen of Oceania 
never
         sets eyes on a citizen of either Eurasia or Eastasia, and he is  forbidden the knowledge
 of foreign languages. If he were allowed contact  with foreigners he would discover that
 they are creatures similar to  himself and that most of what he has been told
         about them 
is lies. The  sealed world in which he lives
         would be broken, and the fear, hatred,  and
 self-righteousness
         on which his morale depends might evaporate. It  is therefore realized
 on all sides that however often Persia, or Egypt,  or Java, or Ceylon may change 
hands, the main frontiers must never be  crossed by anything except bombs. 
 
Under this lies a fact
         never mentioned aloud, but tacitly understood  and acted upon:
 namely, that the conditions of life in all three  super-states are very much the same. In 
Oceania the prevailing  philosophy is called Ingsoc, in Eurasia it is called
         Neo-Bolshevism, 
and  in Eastasia it is called
         by a Chinese name usually translated as  Death-Worship, but 
perhaps better rendered as Obliteration of the Self.  The citizen of Oceania is not
         allowed 
to know anything of the tenets of  the other
         two philosophies, but he is taught to execrate 
them
         as  barbarous outrages upon morality and common sense. Actually the three  
philosophies are barely distinguishable, and the social systems which  they support are
 not distinguishable at all. Everywhere there is the  same pyramidal structure, the
         same worship
 of semi-divine leader, the  same economy
         existing by and for continuous warfare. It follows
 that
         the  three super-states not only cannot conquer one another, but would gain  no 
advantage by doing so. On the contrary, so long as they remain in  conflict they prop 
one another up, like three sheaves of corn. And, as  usual, the ruling groups
         of all three 
powers are simultaneously aware  and unaware
         of what they are doing. Their lives are 
dedicated to
         world  conquest, but they also know that it is necessary that the war should 
 continue everlastingly and without victory. Meanwhile the fact that  there is no danger of
 conquest makes possible the denial of reality  which is the special feature
         of Ingsoc and its 
rival systems of thought.  Here it
         is necessary to repeat what has been said earlier,
 that
         by  becoming continuous war has fundamentally changed its character. 
 
In past ages, a war, almost by definition, was something
         that sooner  or later came to an 
end,
         usually in unmistakable victory or defeat. In  the past, also, war was one of the main
instruments by which human  societies were kept in touch with physical reality. All rulers 
in all  ages have tried to impose a false view of the world upon their  followers,
         but they could
 not afford to encourage any illusion
         that  tended to impair military efficiency. So long
         as defeat meant the loss  of independence, or some other result generally held to be 
undesirable,  the precautions against defeat had to be serious. Physical facts could  not be
 ignored. In philosophy, or religion, or ethics, or politics, two  and two might
         make five, but
 when one was designing a gun or an  aeroplane
         they had to make four. Inefficient nations
 were always
         conquered sooner or later, and the struggle for efficiency was inimical  to
 illusions. Moreover, to be efficient it was necessary to be able to  learn from the past, 
which meant having a fairly accurate idea of what  had happened in the past.
         Newspapers
 and history books
         were, of course,  always coloured and biased, but falsification of the 
kind that is  practised today would have been impossible. War was a sure safeguard
         of 
 sanity, and so far as the ruling classes were concerned
         it was probably  the most important
 of all safeguards.
         While wars could be won or lost,  no ruling class could be completely
 irresponsible. 
 
But when war becomes literally continuous, it also ceases to be  dangerous. When
         war is
 continuous there is no such thing as military
         necessity. Technical progress can cease and
 the most
         palpable facts can  be denied or disregarded. As we have seen, researches 
that could be  called scientific are still carried out for the purposes of war, but  they 
are essentially a kind of daydreaming, and their failure to show  results is
         not important.
 
 
 Efficiency, even military efficiency, is no  longer needed. Nothing is efficient in Oceania except
 the Thought  Police. Since each of the three super-states is unconquerable,
         each is  in
 effect a separate universe within which
         almost any perversion of  thought can be safely practised. 
 
 
Reality only exerts its pressure  through the needs of everyday life -- the need
         to eat and drink,
 to get  shelter and clothing, to avoid
         swallowing poison or stepping out of  top-storey windows, 
and
         the like. Between life and death, and between  physical pleasure and physical pain, there
 is still a distinction, but  that is all. Cut off from contact with the outer world, and with the
         past, 
the citizen of Oceania is like a man in interstellar
         space, who  has no way of knowing which
 direction is
         up and which is down. The  rulers of such a state are absolute, as the Pharaohs
 or the Caesars  could not be. They are obliged to prevent their followers from starving  to death
         
in numbers large enough to be inconvenient, and they
         are  obliged to remain at the same low 
level of military
         technique as their  rivals; but once that minimum is achieved, they can twist reality 
into  whatever shape they choose. 
 
The war, therefore, if we judge it by the standards of previous
         wars, is merely an imposture.
 It is like the battles
         between certain  ruminant animals whose horns are set at such an
 angle that they are  incapable of hurting one another. But though it is unreal it is not  meaningless.
 It eats up the surplus of consumable goods, and it helps to  preserve the special
                  mental 
atmosphere that a hierarchical society
          needs.          War, it will be seen, is now a purely internal affair.
 
 
 In the  past, the ruling groups of all countries,
         although they might recognize          their common
         interest and therefore limit the destructiveness          of war,  did fight against one another, and 
the victor          always plundered the  vanquished. In our own day they are
         not fighting against
 one another at  all. The war is
         waged by each ruling group against its own subjects, and
          the object of the war is not to make or prevent conquests of territory,  but          to keep the 
structure of society intact. The very word          'war',  therefore, has become
         misleading. 
 
 
It would probably be accurate to say  that by becoming continuous war          has ceased
         to exist.
 
 
The peculiar  pressure that it exerted on human beings between the Neolithic Age and  the
 early twentieth century has disappeared and been replaced by  something quite
                  different. 
The effect would be much the same
         if the           three super-states, instead of fighting one another,
          should agree to  live in perpetual peace, each inviolate within its own boundaries. For  in 
that case each would still be a self-contained universe, freed for  ever from
         the sobering
 influence of external danger. A peace that
         was  truly permanent would be the          same as a
         permanent war. This -- although  the vast          majority of Party members understand it 
only in a shallower           sense -- is the inner meaning of the Party slogan: War is Peace.
         
 
 
GEORGE
                  ORWELL'S EVOLVING VIEWS ON JEWS 
 
         Raymond S. Solomon - The Jerusalem Post (Israel) 
 
  
 To be aware that Orwell
                  had an antisemitic streak, you only have to read 
Down and Out in Paris and London, in which the term "the Jew" is used many times. 
 
Both Boris, a former soldier in
                  the Czarist army, and the narrator of Down and Out, 
who is based on Orwell, are antisemitic. A diary written by Orwell, in preparation for 
Down and Out, has many antisemitic comments. There is
                  also significant antisemitism 
in
         A          Clergyman's Daughter.  In the Trafalgar Square scene there is a character called 
"The Kike." The tendency to use terms like "the
         Jew," and "pro-Jew"          continues  into his
 later writings, letters          and diaries. For example, in a July 15,  1942, letter to Alex Comfort
         
discussing the book The Clue to History,
         Orwell comments, "This was a rather unbalanced
 book and extremely pro-Jew in tendency."